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Modi’s Jordan–Ethiopia–Oman Tour, CEPA, and India’s Pitch in a Transactional Global Order
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Modi’s Jordan–Ethiopia–Oman Tour, CEPA, and India’s Pitch in a Transactional Global Order

Modi’s Jordan–Ethiopia–Oman Tour, CEPA, and India’s Pitch in a Transactional Global Order

Published:Mon Dec 22 2025 05:30:00 GMT+0530 (India Standard Time)

The Hindu
Rida Mascot Contrarian Ruru
1 5 10
Intensity
The Indian Express
Rida Mascot Pro-Authority Ruru
1 5 10
Intensity

Summary

Muscat / Addis Ababa / Amman / New Delhi, 22 December 2025: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s three-stop tour of Jordan, Ethiopia and Oman (15–18 December 2025) marked a calibrated diplomatic push across West Asia and Africa, bringing together trade integration, development partnerships, and political signalling at a moment when the global order is increasingly shaped by hard bargains, disrupted corridors, and competing alignments. Read as a single narrative, the visit sought to convert India’s expanding footprint in the Global South into concrete outcomes—anchored by a major trade pact with Oman, a renewed strategic engagement with Ethiopia, and targeted cooperation with Jordan amid regional instability.

The most tangible deliverable came in Muscat, where India and Oman signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) on 18 December. Under the pact, Oman grants zero-duty access on over 98% of its tariff lines for Indian exports, while India reduces tariffs on a large share of its lines covering the vast majority of Omani imports by value. Bilateral trade, which has more than doubled in recent years to about $10 billion, is expected to broaden further across manufacturing, services and energy-linked sectors. Beyond the tariff schedules, the agreement carries strategic weight: Oman’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz—a critical global energy chokepoint—makes CEPA a long-term commercial and logistical anchor for India in a volatile maritime neighbourhood. The next test will be implementation, including rules of origin, customs facilitation and services access, which will determine whether headline concessions translate into sustained export growth.

In Ethiopia, Modi’s first visit as Prime Minister advanced India’s Africa engagement from political messaging to institutional cooperation. India and Ethiopia announced steps toward a strategic partnership, signing agreements on United Nations peacekeeper training, customs and capacity-building, and the establishment of a data centre for Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, alongside commitments to strengthen trade, technology exchange and counterterrorism cooperation. Addis Ababa’s role as the headquarters of the African Union and its membership in BRICS amplify the significance of the outreach, positioning Ethiopia as a gateway for India’s broader engagement with African multilateralism and development priorities. India’s approach here emphasises skills, digital infrastructure and governance support—areas that align with Ethiopia’s reform agenda while avoiding the debt-heavy pitfalls associated with large-scale financing.

The Jordan leg focused on practical cooperation and political reassurance. India and Jordan launched initiatives spanning renewable energy, water management, culture and digital linkages, even as regional conflict continued to unsettle West Asia. The visit unfolded against uncertainty surrounding the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), whose viability depends on stability across transit states. India’s presence in Amman, coupled with reiterated support for a two-state solution for Palestine, was aimed at sustaining trust across Arab partners at a time when diplomatic positions are closely scrutinised.

Why this matters:

The tour illustrates how India is navigating a transactional international environment—pairing deal-driven diplomacy with longer-horizon partnerships in Africa and careful political signalling in West Asia. In the near term, success will be measured by CEPA utilisation, timely rollout of Ethiopia’s digital and training projects, and conversion of Jordan’s agreements into operational outcomes. Over the longer term, the stakes are reputational and strategic: partners will judge India not by summit choreography but by its ability to deliver economic value, sustain development commitments, and maintain a coherent political posture across a region where trade corridors and alliances remain vulnerable to sudden shocks.

Outlet-Wise Coverage Analysis | Ruru Ratings

Outlet Ruru Ratings Intensity
The Hindu
Rida Mascot Contrarian Ruru
7

Notes and Context: Uses the tour as a lens to argue that in a transactional global order, bilateral “bonhomie” and headline agreements must be matched by a coherent, consistently reiterated strategic message—especially on West Asia conflict diplomacy and corridor politics—otherwise the visit risks remaining “optics” rather than shaping a shared vision.

The Indian Express
Rida Mascot Pro-Authority Ruru
8

Notes and Context: Indian Express 🙂 Pro-Authority Ruru 8 Argues Modi’s post-2014 “Think West” approach has transformed India’s West Asia policy, highlighting CEPA’s scale (zero-duty access on 98%+ Omani tariff lines), expanded regional engagement, and “personal diplomacy” delivering political and strategic gains, including improved Gulf perceptions of India.

Comparative Analysis

Convergence:

Both pieces treat the tour—and especially the Oman CEPA—as proof that West Asia and adjacent regions now sit at the core of India’s economic and strategic calculus. They agree that India is trying to operate in a world where outcomes are increasingly negotiated through deals, corridor politics, and carefully managed alignments.

Frame Divergence:

The split is essentially performance review vs. strategy audit. The Indian Express column reads the trip as evidence that India’s West Asia diplomacy has already “delivered,” and that the Modi era’s political investment has converted into tangible advantages. The Hindu editorial, by contrast, treats the same set of visits and agreements as insufficient unless India demonstrates consistency and follow-through on hard geopolitical questions—particularly where West Asia conflict diplomacy and competing interlocutors demand clarity rather than calibrated symbolism.

The Hindu

Its emphasis is on risk: that India’s messaging—especially when balancing different West Asia partners—can be read as episodic reassurance rather than a stable, principled position that influences outcomes. The editorial’s core claim is that diplomacy must move from atmospherics to a credible, reiterated strategy that survives scrutiny across audiences, including India’s “Israeli interlocutors” and the broader Global South.

Indian Express

Its emphasis is on gains: that India has decisively upgraded its standing in West Asia through sustained engagement, expanded partnerships, and leader-level diplomacy. CEPA is presented as the clearest marker of this shift, alongside claims that India has reduced Pakistan’s centrality in Gulf thinking, strengthened diaspora leverage, and positioned itself as a security provider in the region.

Quote Spectrum

Rida Quote

Narendra Modi (Prime Minister of India): “The partnership with Oman will open new avenues for trade, investment and shared prosperity.”

— Joint statement / Official readout cited in The Hindu

Rida Quote

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq (Sultan of Oman): The CEPA reflects “the depth of economic ties and mutual confidence between Oman and India.”

— Official statement referenced in Indian Express commentary

Rida Quote

Abiy Ahmed Ali (Prime Minister of Ethiopia): India and Ethiopia will work to “strengthen trade, knowledge exchange and technology cooperation.”

— Official readout cited in The Hindu

Rida Quote

King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein (Jordan): Emphasised cooperation on water and renewable energy and the need for peace and stability in West Asia.

— Joint statement referenced in The Hindu

Rida Synthesis

India’s Jordan–Ethiopia–Oman tour illustrates a diplomacy that is increasingly portfolio-driven: concrete trade deals where feasible, institution-building partnerships where influence compounds over time, and calibrated political signalling in conflict-affected regions. The Oman CEPA underscores India’s capacity to secure deep market access in strategically vital geographies, while Ethiopia reflects a quieter but potentially more durable play for influence within African multilateral and development ecosystems. Jordan, by contrast, highlights the limits of diplomacy in volatile theatres—where reassurance and presence matter even when outcomes are constrained by forces beyond bilateral control. Taken together, the tour shows India positioning itself as a pragmatic actor of the Global South: less ideological, more transactional, but still seeking room to shape norms and alignments as the global order fragments.

Reference Bench (Official-Data Panel)

  • Official Government of India press releases on PM Modi’s visits to Jordan, Ethiopia and Oman (December 2025)
  • Joint Statements and MoU announcements issued by the Prime Minister’s Office (India) and partner governments
  • Trade and tariff details from India–Oman CEPA summaries released by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Oman’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment Promotion
  • African Union background material on Ethiopia’s institutional role and India–Africa engagement
  • Public reporting on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) from G7 / partner-country announcements and reputable international news agencies

Disclaimer: The analysis, assessments, and comparative interpretations presented above are based on a good-faith, editorial evaluation of publicly available news reports from the referenced outlets. All Ruru ratings, tone/framing observations, and analytical inferences are inherently subjective and reflect Rida’s structured rubric-based methodology rather than any claim of definitive accuracy or intent of the underlying publishers. Readers are encouraged to consult the original articles and primary sources to form their own independent understanding of the events, viewpoints, and narratives discussed. Nothing in this document should be construed as attributing motives, endorsing any political or institutional position, or making any factual representation beyond what is contained in the cited material.