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When Maps Erase People: How India’s Great Nicobar Megaproject Overlooks Tribal Lands
Law & Justice

When Maps Erase People: How India’s Great Nicobar Megaproject Overlooks Tribal Lands

A Strategic Island—and a Foundational Omission

Published:Wed Jan 07 2026 05:30:00 GMT+0530 (India Standard Time)

The Print
Rida Mascot Indigenous-Rights Ruru
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Intensity

Summary

New Delhi | 7 January 2026: India’s proposed megaproject on Great Nicobar Island—envisaged as a transshipment port, international airport, township, power generation facilities, and associated road and logistics infrastructure—has been framed by the Union government as a strategic intervention with long-term economic and geopolitical significance. The project spans hundreds of square kilometres on India’s southernmost island, positioned close to key global shipping lanes in the eastern Indian Ocean.

Yet beneath the scale and ambition of the plan lies a foundational omission with far-reaching consequences: the official maps guiding project planning do not name or mark the lands traditionally used and inhabited by the island’s Indigenous communities. Forests, villages, hunting grounds, and foraging areas that sustain tribal life do not appear as such on planning documents, even as they fall squarely within zones proposed for acquisition, construction, and ecological transformation.

Great Nicobar, covering roughly 920 square kilometres and forming part of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Union Territory, is home to two Indigenous communities whose relationship to land predates modern administration by thousands of years. The Nicobarese are largely settled, practising plantation agriculture (particularly coconut and areca nut), fishing, hunting, and wage labour. On Great Nicobar, their population is estimated at around 1,200 people. The Shompen—classified as a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG)—are a semi-nomadic hunter-gatherer community living deep within the island’s interior forests, with a population estimated at around 250 individuals. Their subsistence, social organisation, and cultural continuity are inseparable from the forests and coastal ecosystems now being reimagined as infrastructure corridors.

Villages Without Names

The megaproject’s proposed footprint cuts across areas long used by both communities for settlement, cultivation, hunting, and seasonal foraging. Nicobarese villages such as Chingenh, Kirasis, Kurchinom, In Haengloi, Pulo Baha, Kokeon, Bui Jayae, and Pulo Pakka are located across Galathea Bay, Pemmaya Bay, and Nanjappa Bay—coastal zones now marked for ports, terminals, power facilities, and supporting infrastructure.

Chingenh, in particular, lies directly within the proposed site of the transshipment terminal at Galathea Bay, an area internationally recognised as a biodiversity hotspot and one of the largest nesting grounds in the world for giant leatherback turtles. These villages are not marginal encroachments but ancestral settlements and customary-use landscapes that have structured Nicobarese life for generations.

Yet in the land-use maps that underpin project planning, these settlements and shared-use areas are not identified as tribal lands. Instead, land is categorised broadly as revenue land, forest reserve, or national park—administrative labels that flatten lived geography into abstract zones. This omission is not incidental. In Indian law, recognition of land is inseparable from recognition of rights. Consent requirements, social-impact assessments, rehabilitation obligations, and constitutional safeguards for tribal communities are activated only once land is formally acknowledged as tribal or customary-use territory.

When maps do not name these lands, the legal architecture designed to protect Indigenous communities is never fully engaged. What follows is a form of dispossession that begins on paper. By reclassifying land without naming who lives on or depends on it, project planning proceeds as if displacement were peripheral rather than foundational. Physical relocation, when it eventually occurs, appears procedurally compliant—even though the safeguards meant to govern it were never meaningfully triggered.

One Map, and a Systemic Blind Spot

For more than two decades, the only detailed map identifying tribal settlements and land use on Great Nicobar has been one prepared between 2000 and 2004 by an independent researcher working with the Andaman Nicobar Environment Team (ANET), later updated after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This map identifies villages, forest-use zones, and shared spaces belonging to both the Nicobarese and the Shompen.

Local administrators have relied on this map informally—particularly during emergencies—to locate tribal communities and understand their distribution across the island. After the tsunami, rescue and relief operations depended heavily on such anthropological knowledge. Officials explicitly sought it out to identify affected settlements, estimate population displacement, and plan rehabilitation colonies such as Rajiv Nagar, where many Nicobarese families were resettled.

Yet this knowledge was never institutionalised. As the emergency phase receded and long-term development planning took precedence, reliance on detailed tribal mapping faded. What had been indispensable during crisis became dispensable during growth planning.

Today, officials across the local administration, the Nicobar Forest Division, and the Directorate of Tribal Welfare reportedly do not possess systematic maps marking tribal villages or foraging grounds. Even national institutions acknowledge this absence. The Anthropological Survey of India, including its Andaman and Nicobar regional centre, does not maintain a map delineating Shompen or Nicobarese territories on Great Nicobar. Anthropologists at the Andaman Nicobar Tribal Research Institute describe the state’s approach as one that relies on vague descriptors—such as “upper road Shompen” or “lower road Shompen”—many of which no longer correspond to physical reality after the tsunami washed away roads and landmarks.

This reflects not an absence of information, but a failure of administrative memory. Indigenous geography is recognised when lives must be saved, but sidelined when land must be acquired.

Mapping as Power in Development Planning

The Great Nicobar case exposes a deeper structural pattern in Indian development governance. Planning systems are built around cadastral maps, survey numbers, and digitised land records—tools designed for fixed plots, exclusive ownership, and revenue administration. Indigenous land use rarely conforms to this logic. It is often communal, seasonal, and ecologically embedded, organised around shared access to forests, coastlines, and inland ecosystems rather than bounded possession.

When planning institutions privilege only what fits these cadastral templates, they shape outcomes long before any ground is broken. Land that can be plotted becomes governable and acquirable; land used in customary, non-linear ways is treated as vacant or underutilised. What cannot be rendered legible within administrative systems cannot be defended within them. Development outcomes are determined less by social reality than by the limits of what the state’s maps are designed to see.

Environmental Clearance Without Social Geography

This cartographic bias is mirrored in regulatory processes. Environmental clearance mechanisms in India are often technically detailed in ecological terms. Project documents meticulously map forest cover, wildlife habitats, coastal regulation zones, protected areas, and biodiversity hotspots, often down to the hectare.

Social geography, particularly in tribal regions, is treated far more abstractly. Project feasibility reports and environment clearance submissions for the Great Nicobar megaproject identify national parks, forest reserves, and revenue villages, but do not mark tribal settlements, shared-use forests, or hunting and foraging grounds. The environment is rendered visible in high resolution; human presence is flattened or omitted.

Clearances can then proceed by addressing ecological mitigation—such as wildlife management or compensatory afforestation—while sidestepping a granular assessment of displacement, livelihood loss, and cultural disruption. Regulatory compliance is achieved, but it remains socially incomplete.

When Law Cannot See the Shompen

The Shompen community illustrates the limits of this framework with particular force. As a semi-nomadic hunter-gatherer people, their relationship to land is fluid and seasonal, shaped by forest ecology rather than permanent villages or surveyed plots. Legal and administrative systems, however, depend on fixity. Land must be bounded, named, and recorded to be recognised.

Applied to the Shompen, this requirement produces a persistent blind spot. Hunting routes, forest camps, and foraging zones central to survival rarely appear on official maps—not because they are marginal, but because the system lacks the conceptual tools to register them. Development thus proceeds on the assumption of emptiness, even as it encroaches on spaces densely inhabited in ways the law does not know how to describe.

Why This Matters

The Great Nicobar megaproject reveals how development can advance by erasing people before displacing them. What is not mapped is treated as if it does not exist; what does not exist on paper cannot assert rights in law. For Indigenous communities whose lives are inseparable from land and forest, this administrative invisibility becomes the most consequential form of exclusion.

At stake is more than a single infrastructure project. The episode raises fundamental questions about how India balances strategic ambition with constitutional commitments to tribal protection, and how development decisions are shaped by the limits of administrative vision. Growth may proceed smoothly on maps that are silent. On the ground, those silences translate into lives uprooted, cultures fragmented, and conflicts deferred rather than resolved.

Outlet-Wise Coverage Analysis | Ruru Ratings

Outlet Ruru Ratings Intensity
The Print
Rida Mascot Indigenous-Rights Ruru
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Notes and Context: The excerpt frames the Great Nicobar megaproject primarily as a governance and rights problem created by administrative “invisibility”: official planning maps and even institution-level holdings allegedly do not systematically mark tribal settlements and foraging grounds, even as the project footprint overlaps these spaces. It grounds the argument in specific settlement names across Galathea Bay, Pemmaya Bay, and Nanjappa Bay, and uses institutional voices (e.g., the Andaman Nicobar Tribal Research Institute; Anthropological Survey of India) to argue that the absence of mapping is not accidental but structural. The tone is investigative and critical, with the core claim that omission at the mapping/record stage can pre-empt meaningful assessment of impact and protections.

Comparative Analysis

Convergence:

Across the excerpt and the public record around the Great Nicobar “Holistic Development” proposal, there is broad alignment on the basic project architecture and geography: the integrated plan includes an International Container Transshipment Terminal (ICTT) (listed at 14.2 million TEU), a greenfield international airport (listed at 4,000 peak-hour passengers), township/area development, and a 450 MVA gas-and-solar power plant, spanning 16,610 hectares of revenue and forest land on Great Nicobar, with project documents naming revenue areas such as Campbell Bay and other settlements in the tehsil.

Frame Divergence:

Where the official file language reads like a large infrastructure proposal with listed capacities, hectares, and clearance categories, The Print’s excerpt treats the same project as a case study in how administrative systems decide whose presence “counts.” The divergence is less about whether the project exists and more about whether the state’s planning instruments are capable of seeing—and therefore protecting—customary tribal land use.

The Print:

The excerpt’s distinctive move is to place mapping at the centre of harm, arguing that the state can simultaneously rely on a detailed civil-society map (prepared 2000–2004 and used after the 2004 tsunami) and yet proceed with project planning using maps that allegedly do not list tribal settlements and foraging grounds. It builds this case through (i) granular place-naming (e.g., Chingenh, In Haengloi, Kokeon), (ii) institutional testimony that “there has been no systematic mapping effort” and that bureaucratic descriptors like “upper road Shompen” are effectively unusable post-tsunami, and (iii) a direct comparison to the environment-clearance documentation that lists the project in revenue areas while “completely ignoring” the overlap with tribal areas.

Quote Spectrum

Rida Quote

Vishvajit Pandya (Anthropologist; Director, Andaman Nicobar Tribal Research Institute) — “The government has no proper map of tribal areas. There has been no systematic mapping effort.”

— The Print

Rida Quote

Vishvajit Pandya (Anthropologist; Director, Andaman Nicobar Tribal Research Institute) — “They use vague language like ‘upper road Shompen’ and ‘lower road Shompen’.”

— The Print

Rida Quote

Vishvajit Pandya (Anthropologist; Director, Andaman Nicobar Tribal Research Institute) — “And these roads have been washed away in the [2004] tsunami! It’s a babu’s idea of demarcation.”

— The Print

Rida Quote

Barnabas (local voice cited in the excerpt) — “All these villages will go when the project comes. These are all tribal villages.”

— The Print

Rida Synthesis

The underlying issue is not simply displacement risk in the abstract, but a more technical and decisive question: what the state chooses to record becomes what the state can govern, acquire, and legally defend. Great Nicobar is described as home to the Nicobarese (a largely settled community, with the Great Nicobar population stated at about 1,200) and the Shompen (described as a semi-nomadic hunter-gatherer group and a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group, stated at about 250). The excerpt argues that their land use—especially foraging, hunting, and forest-based lifeways—often resists neat cadastral capture, so when official maps omit it, the omission becomes operational: it shapes impact assessment, the seriousness of “alternatives,” and the evidentiary base on which clearances and acquisitions proceed.

What the coverage adds—beyond the usual “project vs environment” framing—is an institutional diagnosis: cartography is being used as a gatekeeper for recognition. The Print anchors this not in generic critique but in a chain of administrative practice: reliance on one detailed non-state map in moments of emergency, lack of systematic mapping across offices in routine governance, and the claim that even national-level institutional repositories do not hold a definitive map of Shompen/Nicobarese lands on Great Nicobar. The result is a story that treats “missing names on maps” as a primary governance failure—one that can precede, and effectively enable, physical displacement.

Reference Bench (Official-Data Panel)

  • The Print: “Govt doesn’t name tribal lands on maps for megaprojects.”
  • MoEFCC Environment Clearance Portal (Form-A / Project Details): “Holistic Development of Great Nicobar Island…” (lists 16,610 ha, ICTT capacity 14.2M TEU, airport 4,000 PHP, ₹75,000 crore project cost, etc.).
  • MoEFCC Environment Clearance Portal (Pre-Feasibility / linked document): “Holistic Development of Great Nicobar Island…” (project documentation bundle).
  • UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme (Great Nicobar): background on the Great Nicobar biosphere reserve and tribal presence (Shompen/Nicobarese context). (UNESCO)
  • Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways (EOI PDF, Galathea Bay transshipment terminal): official framing of the Galathea Bay terminal opportunity and strategic logic.
  • The Guardian (contextual external reporting): international concern framing and high-level risk claims around the project and Shompen vulnerability (useful as external discourse context, not as primary factual base for the excerpt’s specific mapping claims).

Disclaimer: The analysis, assessments, and comparative interpretations presented above are based on a good-faith, editorial evaluation of publicly available news reports from the referenced outlets. All Ruru ratings, tone/framing observations, and analytical inferences are inherently subjective and reflect Rida’s structured rubric-based methodology rather than any claim of definitive accuracy or intent of the underlying publishers. Readers are encouraged to consult the original articles and primary sources to form their own independent understanding of the events, viewpoints, and narratives discussed. Nothing in this document should be construed as attributing motives, endorsing any political or institutional position, or making any factual representation beyond what is contained in the cited material.